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THE NEW ARTICLE NINE OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE:
AN INTRODUCTION AND CRITIQUE
William C. Headrick*
Part It
The first part of this article, which appears in the previous issue
of the Montana Law Review, was concerned primarily with the rules
relating to the attachment and perfection of security interests under
the new Article Nine. The bulk of this part of the article deals with
the subject of priorities, after which certain conflict of laws problems
will be considered.
Priorities Among Perfected Security Interests
As between two security interests, of which one is perfected and
the other is not, the perfected one will invariably prevail, even when
it is later in time and the party who perfected knew of the existence
of the rival interest. There remains for discussion only the possible
conflicts between perfected security interests. For such situations the
old and new section 9-312 has rules governing three cases: first, the
conflict over inventory between a floor-plan financer with an after-
acquired property clause and a later purchase money secured party;
second, the conflict over goods other than inventory (which would be
mainly equipment) between an older security interest with an after-
acquired property clause and a later one of the purchase money variety;
and third, all other conflicts, which are governed by a general rule.
a) PURCHASE MONEY PRIORITY IN EQUIPMENT
The conflict over equipment involves a value judgment on the
financer who claims such goods in an after-acquired property clause.
The Code does not invalidate after-acquired property clauses in equip-
ment, but it surrounds them with unfavored treatment. Section 9-108
declares the after-acquired equipment to be received for an antecedent
debt, thus making the security interest vulnerable in bankruptcy if the
other elements of a preference are shown. And the priorities rule in
section 9-312(4) cuts it down also, by allowing a rival purchase money
security interest to prevail over it. The only difference between the
old and the new version of this subsection is that the new one specifies
that the purchase money secured party prevails not only with respect
to the equipment itself, but also with respect to the proceeds thereof.
The rule of section 9-312(4) also resolves an entirely different
conflict: one in which equipment is bought under a purchase money
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agreement and later used by the debtor as collateral to obtain a loan.
It is obvious that the purchase money party should prevail, and he will
if he files within the ten day period for retroactive perfection which
is granted by section 9-301(2). For consumer goods the same is true,
except that the purchase money party has a perfected interest without
filing. Thus no lender can be secure with a chattel mortgage on con-
sumer goods. Even if he files and a rival purchase money party fails
to file, the latter will prevail over him.
b) PURCHASE MONEY PRIORITY IN INVENTORY
The rule on inventory, which is found in section 9-312(3), could
have been simplified by providing that the floor plan financer, assuming
he has filed, prevails over the later purchase money party. Such a
simple rule would have made sense, because a debtor who gets inventory
financing through a floor plan has no business financing himself again
on the same collateral by buying it subject to a purchase money interest.
One contemplating obtaining such an interest should first consult the
files to see whether the debtor has mortgaged his inventory, and, if he
has, the purchase money creditor would know that he is subordinate,
and might decide not to extend credit.
But the approach taken by Article Nine is not so simple. The
draftsmen evidently wanted to allow the debtor to receive the benefit
of purchase money financing when he could do so on more favorable
terms than those of his existing floor plan. The only way to do this is
to allow the purchase money party to prevail over the floor plan financer.
But then it becomes necessary to warn the floor plan financer of the
debtor's intended purchase, so that he does not extend credit on the
merchandise as it comes into the debtor's possession. He cannot be made
to rely on the debtor's honesty in not asking him for credit when he
has given a purchase money interest to another; hence, the rule is that
the purchase money creditor must give notice of his intent to finance
to his potential rival, on pain of losing his priority. This rule was left
intact in the revision, but no less than four changes of detail were made
in the subsection.
First, the old subsection provides that the prospective purchase
money creditor must give notice not only to floor plan financers whose
interests are on file, but also to those whom he happens to know. In
line with its policy of eliminating the requirement of knowledge and
strengthening the filing system, the new Article Nine provides that
only floor plan creditors with interests on file are entitled to notice.
Second, the old subsection describes the floor plan lender, if he
was not known to the prospective purchase money party, as one who
"prior to the date of the filing made by the holder of the purchase
money security interest, had filed a financing statement." This phrase
assumed that the purchase money party was filing as soon as he
1973]
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obtained his interest. But there are two situations in which a purchase
money security interest can be filed after the interest attaches and still
be perfected from its inception. One is the general rule of section 9-301
(2), giving purchase money creditors ten days to file with retroactive
effect; the other is the special rule on trust receipts of section 9-304(4)
and (5), which gives a twenty-one day perfected security interest with-
out filing.
The old Article Nine contemplates the first of these two rules on
belated filing, but not the second. It deals with the first by depriving
the purchase money creditor of his ten day period for filing, when it
says that for priority his interest must be "perfected at the time the
debtor receives possession of the collateral" (section 9-312(3) (a)). In
place of "perfected," the word "filed" should have been used, but the
meaning is clear from the context when subsection (3) is compared with
subsection (4).
The second case of belated filing, which exists in the trust receipts
situation, was not contemplated in the old section 9-312(3). The con-
sequence, if the words are taken literally, is that the purchase money
creditor does not need to give notice until he files, which may be
twenty-one days after the debtor received possession of the goods.
Thus the debtor could deceive his floor plan financer into advancing
money to him on the strength of the goods during those twenty-one
days. Since one should not read a statute literally to cover a case not
contemplated by the draftsmen, the better view, under the old Code,
would be to give priority to the floor plan financer unless he received
notice before the debtor obtained the goods. The new Code makes this
reading explicit by providing that the notice must be given "before
the beginning of the 21 day period where the purchase money security
interest is temporarily perfected without filing or possession (subsection
(5) of Section 9-304)" (section 9-312(3) (b)). Hence, a trust receipt
lender must search the files before releasing the document or goods to
the debtor, although he still has twenty-one days thereafter in which
to file his financing statement. But if the goods become proceeds during
that time, he has only ten days from the time of their sale or other
disposition in which to file his interest in the resulting accounts or
chattel paper.
The quoted language makes reference only to subsection (5) of
section 9-304, but the same principle should apply to the very similar
case under subsection (4) of section 9-304. This subsection describes
the rights which a bank acquires when it finances a purchase of goods
represented by documents, without having previously issued a letter
of credit. Upon receipt of the documents, the bank pays the accompany-
ing draft, and releases the documents to the debtor upon obtaining a
written security agreement or trust receipt. The bank is a purchase
money lender in such a case, and if a floor plan financer has an interest
on file covering the inventory, the bank should be required to give him
[Vol. 34
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notice at the moment it releases the documents to the debtor, at the
risk of losing its priority. It is from this time on that the debtor has
constructive possession of the goods, and he may at any time obtain
actual possession by surrendering the documents.
The third change made in section 9-312(3) deals with the continua-
tion of the purchase money lender's priority in proceeds. The old sub-
section is silent on this point and its most natural reading is that what-
ever priority exists for the original collateral exists also for the proceeds.
The possibility of this reading was frightening to accounts financers,
since accounts are proceeds of inventory. Of course, they could not be
prejudiced unless they received notice of the inventory financer's su-
perior claim to their accounts, but they had no way of knowing whether
a given account, as it arose, was traceable to inventory which was un-
burdened or to inventory subject to the purchase money security
interest of which they had received notice. For this reason, accounts
financers prohibited their debtors from buying inventory subject to
purchase money security interests and declared a default whenever
they received a notice. The revised section 9-312(3) insulates the ac-
counts financers from purchase money security interests in inventory.
It does so by omitting accounts from the types of proceeds in which
the purchase money interest continues to have priority. The priority
is only for such proceeds as are "identifiable cash proceeds received on
or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer" (section 9-312(3)).
The fourth change in subsection (3) is a statement of how far in
advance a valid notice may be given. There is no requirement of giving
notice for each purchase money transaction, since the notice may be
not only of a transaction which has taken place, but also of an intent
to engage in transactions in the future. For how long is such a notice
valid? The old Code is silent on this point; the new Code makes it
effective for, five years. That may seem like a long time for a floor
plan financer to remain aware of a notice, but at least the period has
the virtue of lasting as long as a filing, and thus being in itself easy
to remember.
c) GENERAL RULE OF PRIORITY
Subsection (5) of section 9-312 contains the general rule for all
cases not covered elsewhere. The old version is phrased in two parts:
if both security interests are perfected by filing, priority depends on
the order of filing; if one is perfected by filing and the other is per-
fected in some other way, priority depends on the order of perfection.
This dual approach was required by the possibility of notice filing. An
interest can be filed long before it arises and is perfected. (That there
can be no perfection before attachment is made clear by section 9-303 (1).)
Thus, in the case of interests perfected by filing, an order-of-filing rule
makes sense. The problems arise in the opposite case, where one security
interest is perfected by filing and the other is not. The order-of-per-
1973]
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fection rule of the old section 9-312(5) gives rise to difficulties mainly
in the field of proceeds, since other interests are taken care of in sub-
sections (3) and (4). The most important situation is the one in which
an accounts financer has filed first, and then the debtor gives a floor
plan security interest in inventory to another lender. The other lender
will lay claim to the accounts as proceeds of the sale of the inventory.
It is debatable whether this security interest in the accounts as proceeds
is perfected by the filing with respect to the inventory or by the ten-day
rule of secret perfection for proceeds. If it is assumed that the floor
plan financer's security interest in proceeds is perfected without filing,
then his priority against the accounts financer must be determined by
the order-of-perfection rule. Who perfected first? It will usually be
the inventory financer, whose interest arose when the goods came into
the debtor's possession. The assignee of accounts will, under the usual
arrangements of future advances and future accounts, not given value and
hence not have a perfected interest until the debtor assigns the accounts
to him. Hence, the inventory financer will prevail over the accounts
financer despite the fact that the accounts financer was first to file.
This possibility is enough to undermine the foundation of accounts
financing, since no accounts financer can be secure if a later-to-file
inventory financer can come ahead of him. He can only assure himself of
priority at the high cost to the debtor of taking a security interest in
his inventory, thus preventing him from assigning it to some other lender.
The new Article Nine has resolved the problem by providing,
first, that "conflicting security interests rank according to priority in
time of filing or perfection," (section 9-312(5) (a)) thus replacing the
dual rule of the old Article Nine with a single and much simpler rule;
and second, by specifying that the date of filing or perfection as to
the original collateral is also the date on which the right to proceeds
is deemed to have been filed or perfected.
Under the new system, the accounts financer who files first is prior
to any later inventory financer. But he must still beware of filing
afterwards. Suppose the debtor who is opening a new business gives a
security interest in his inventory to a financer. At this point, his inven-
tory is the only source of badly needed financing, since no accounts
arise until he has made sales. As his business begins to develop, he
assigns his accounts to another financer. The accounts financer will be
subordinate. The inventory financer has a claim to the accounts as pro-
ceeds. And if the debtor's principal executive office is at the same
location as the inventory, as is apt to be the case with a small business,
the inventory financcr is not required to refile for proceeds. Hence, he
prevails over the accounts financer with respect to all the accounts,
whether they arose during the last ten days or prior to that time.
This feature of the new Article Nine is undesirable, because it
prevents financing arrangements from being made in the natural order
[Vol. 34
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of first inventory and then accounts. It would have been preferable to
say that the inventory financer's right to proceeds is limited to cash
proceeds, thus leaving accounts unencumbered for later financing.
d) PRIORITY OF CONSIGNORS
The consignor is one who delivers (or consigns) goods to a mer-
chant, for him to sell as agent of the consignor, with the right to return
any unsold merchandise and the obligation to render accounts period-
ically as the consignor's good are sold. Consignment is used primarily
as a substitute for financing. The consignor is comparable to a seller
who retains a purchase money security interest in inventory, and the
consignee is comparable to a debtor. For this reason, the consignor is
required to publicize the arrangement by filing unless it is notorious
(sections 2-326(3) and 9-408).
A new section 9-114, which is added to the Code by the revision,
carries the analogy to a security interest one step further, and gives
the same rule of priority to the consignor as section 9-312(3) gives to
the purchase money secured party. The conflict resolved is that between
a prior floor plan inventory financer and a later consignor. The con-
signor gets a priority only if he gives notice to the inventory financer
of his consignment or intent to consign before the consignee-debtor gets
possession of the goods.
Priorities in Crops and Fixtures
a) GENERAL RULE
In cases on the borderline between real and personal property, such
as crops, timber, minerals, and fixtures, the question of priority is still
more complicated than it is with respect to pure goods. There is not only
the potential conflict between successive chattel security interests, which
would have to be resolved under section 9-312, there is also the conflict
over original collateral between real estate parties (typically mortgagees
and grantees) and the Article Nine secured creditor. The general solu-
tion consists of compelling the secured creditor to file his financing
statement in the real estate records, and to utilize the first-to-file rule
for priority. In the case of fixtures, the principle is explicitly stated
in old section 9-313(4) and new section 9-313(3) (b). Crops are the ex-
ception.
b) PRIORITIES IN CROPS
Since a security interest in growing crops must be filed in the
chattel records (section 9-401), it is uncertain whether the first-to-file
rule is the proper one to resolve the conflict between the crop mortgagee
and real estate parties, since a filing in the chattel records is not con-
structive notice to them. The whole area of crop priorities was left un-
touched by the draftsmen, except for one provision of detail contained
in section 9-312(2), which they carried over from the old Code, despite
1973]
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full awareness "that it is of little practical effect.", The gist of the rule
of section 9-312(2) is that a crop loan which enables a farmer to produce
his current crop has priority over earlier security interests in the crops,
but only if the farmer is six months or more in default in the payment
of the earlier interests. The rule is very misleading, because it gives the
impression that it embodies a policy of allowing farmers to obtain enabl-
ing crop loans despite prior encumbrances. Such a policy would have
been a very wise one to pursue. The crop priority of the current lender
would work no injustice on the prior financers, who would have him
to thank for any crop at all. Yet the General Comment 2 claims that
no demand was expressed for an effective crop priority rule, and that
if one were inserted it would "create a revolutionary change." In fact,
it would probably be ineffectual, since there would be no way to prevent
bankers from getting around it by making the obtaining of a crop loan
an event of default.
Under these circumstances, why not abolish the rule of section 9-
312(2) ? This important question has been left unanswered by the Gen-
eral Comment. Perhaps there is no bankers' opposition to it, because it
contains a loophole as large as itself. This loophole is the requirement
that the prior loan be in default by more than six months. To take
advantage of it, the original financer can either insert in his agreement
a clause allowing him to grant extensions of time to the farmer until
the latter decides to pay the debt, in effect preventing the debt from
becoming in default; or, if no such a clause has been inserted, insist that
the farmer agree to an extension under threat of foreclosure. The crop
priorities rule, which appears to embody a policy of facilitating crop
financing, in reality is no more than a trap for the occasional lender who
lets his loan stay in default for more than six months, either out of
kindness or an inability to understand the words "to the extent that
such earlier interest secures obligations due more than six months before
the crops become growing crops by planting or otherwise," which are
part of a paragraph-long sentence without punctuation (section 9-312(2)).
C) PURCHASE MONEY PRIORITY IN FIXTURES AGAINST NON-CONSTRUC-
TION MORTGAGES.
For the borderline cases other than fixtures, the first-to-file rule is
enough. But for fixtures there is the possibility of purchase money
security interests which arise in the goods before they become fixtures.
Hence a rule is needed, analogous to the one in section 9-312(4), which
gives the purchase money creditor a priority over lender-type security
interests. Such a rule is justified by the fact that the purchase money
financer supplies and adds the goods to the real estate, and that to deny
him a priority would produce an unjust enrichment for the competing
'General Comment, paragraph B-7.
'Id.
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lender, who claims an interest in the goods as after-acquired property
in a previously recorded mortgage. The priority for purchase money
interests exists in both the old version of Article Nine (section 9-313(2))
and in the new version (section 9-313(4) (a)).
Yet there is a world of difference between the old and the new rule.
The old rule went too far in protecting the purchase money party; in
contrast, the new rule shows a decided bias in favor of the mortgagee.
A serious defect of the old system, which is pointed out in Comment
4(a) to the new section 9-313, is that it subordinates the mortgagee to
the rival purchase money party, even when the latter fails to file his
interest. As an exception, the mortgagee is protected only to the extent
that he makes an advance during the perfection gap of the purchase
money interest. The reason for this exception is the assumption that
the mortgagee relies on the record when he makes an advance (either
as an original loan or a future advance), but does not rely on future
fixtures, which are claimed without any assurance that they will ever
be placed on the land. This assumption is valid for most mortgages, but
is inaccurate in the case of construction mortgages, where the mortgagee,
who finances the fixtures as well as the building, does rely on fixtures
in extending credit even before they are installed. Hence, the old section
9-313 contains two injustices: it fails to require perfection of the pur-
chase money interest as a condition to priority over real estate mort-
gagees (perfection should always be required in the priority contest,
as proof of seriousness) ; and it forgets the construction mortgagee, with
his peculiar reliance on future fixtures.
Under the new section 9-313, the purchase money interest can obtain
priority over an ordinary, non-construction mortgage under complex
rules which depend on whether the fixture is a machine, a consumer
appliance, or equipment in general. This applies to the usual situation,
where the mortgage is recorded before the owner buys the fixtures
with purchase money financing. In this case, as a general rule,
the purchase money financer will have to fixture file before the goods
become fixtures or within ten days thereafter (section 9-313(4) (a)).
His failure to file or his belated filing is considered proof of lack of
seriousness on his part, and he is subordinated despite the fact that
the mortgagee could not have relied on the fixture as security.
When a purchase money interest is filed before the goods become
fixtures, the only mortgagee with whom a conflict could arise is a prior
mortgagee, one who claimed the fixtures under an after-acquired prop-
erty or future-fixtures clause. But when a ten-day grace period is given.
a mortgagee could conceivably intervene during that period. It would
be necessary for the mortgagee to extend credit and record within that
time. For this situation, subsection (4) (a) specially provides that the
ten-day grace period is effective only if "the interest of the encumbrancer
or owner arises before the goods become fixtures." The purchase money
1973]
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party who files within ten days is therefore protected only against the
claims of prior mortgagees armed with future-fixture clauses. He is not
protected against the intervening mortgagee who, during the ten day
period, obtained and recorded his mortgage, provided, as always, that
the mortgage was recorded first.
This dent in the ten-day grace period is not of great importance,
yet it breaks with the system established for chattels in section 9-312(4),
and it undermines the value of the grace period for the purchase money
financer. Under the new system, if he wants to be assured of a first
priority over the fixtures he supplies, the financer must file before
affixation takes place; otherwise, he runs the risk of an intervening
mortgagee obtaining priority over him.
There are exceptions to the requirement of a fixture filing for
factory or office machines and for domestic appliances which are con-
sumer goods, if such objects are "readily removable." In these cases,
the purchase money party prevails over the mortgagee if the security
interest is "perfected by any method permitted by this Article" (section
9-313(4) (c)). In the case of removable consumer appliances the pur-
chase money interest gains perfection without need even of a chattel
filing (section 9-302(1)(d)), so that the financer of such goods prevails
under the new Code in the same way as he does under the old.
Consumer appliances which are not readily removable are not within
the exception. Hence the purchase money financer of such goods will
have to fixture file either before they are affixed or within ten days
thereafter, in order to prevail over the pre-existing mortgagee under
subsection (4) (a).
Fixture appliances which are not consumer goods, i.e., appliances
installed in apartment buildings or in single dwellings used for rental
purposes, are also treated like fixtures in general, and subject to the
rule of subsection (4) (a).
The multiplicity of distinctions among the various classes of do-
mestic appliances which become fixtures encourages financers to fix-
ture file as a safeguard against errors of classification. The tight ex-
ception for those which are readily removable and consumer goods is
more useful as a means of doing justice to a carefree financer than as a
guide to sound business practice.
Readily removable machines are governed by the same rule as
readily removable consumer appliances, except that the "method per-
mitted by this Article" for their perfection is a chattel filing, which
must take place "before the goods become fixtures." Once they are
affixed, it is too late to chattel file.
The timing requirement for the chattel filing is severe and unneces-
sary. It is predicated on the notion that chattel filing is possible only
for chattels, which is what the machines are before affixation. But if
[Vol. 34
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the assumption that the mortgagee does not rely on the machines is
correct, then the financer should not be penalized if he fails to realize
that these "readily removable" objects will become "fixtures" and there-
fore uses the chattel files after affixation.
However, if the financer is aware of the fact that his machines will
become fixtures, he can take advantage of a second chance: he still
has ten days from the date of affixation in which to fixture file under
subsection (4) (a). In other words, once the machine is affixed, the pur-
chase money financer loses the benefit of the special rule on removable
machines which permits him to chattel file; thereafter he is subjected
to the same rule as purchase money financers of fixtures in general, and
he must fixture file if he wishes to attain priority over the mortgagee.
The double filing system for removable machines appears too com-
plex to be fully useful in everyday transactions. The safest course for a
purchase money financer to follow is to fixture file whenever any piece
of equipment is sold for use as a fixture. The special rule on chattel
filing would serve as an escape hatch whenever the equipment is a
machine and the financer chattel-filed because he did not know that it
would be affixed.
A question likely to arise often under these exceptions is: when
is a fixture "readily removable"? There is no easy answer. There must
be some fixtures which are neither ordinary ordinary building materials
nor readily removable machines or appliances. The exclusion of ordinary
building materials from the scope of Article Nine (section 9-313(2))
makes it necessary to distinguish among the other fixtures, those which
are readily removable and those which are not. The question of ready
removability is one which should be decided uniformly throughout the
country. Hence, the fact that an object is a fixture under local law does
not mean that it is not readily removable. Beyond these generalizations,
it is not possible to give concrete meaning to the new concept. Drawing
of the line between what is readily removable and what is not will take
place as cases are decided.
Of course, in many situations readily removable machines or appli-
ances will not be fixtures. Only if they are, because of the intent that
they remain permanently on the premises despite the looseness of their
affixation, does the real estate party have an interest in them. If the
machines or appliances are chattels, perfection may be required for
priority over conflicting chattel financers and lien creditors, but not for
priority over real estate parties.
The rules governing the conflict between non-construction mort-
gagees and purchase money parties have been oriented significantly in
favor of the former. The ten-day grace period has been cut down; it is
good only if a fixture filing is made and there is no intervening mort-
gagee. A chattel-filing, which is permitted for removable machines, must
be made immediately, otherwise even prior mortgagees can defeat the
1973]
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financer's interest. The no-filing rule for appliances is restricted to those
which are readily removable and constitute consumer goods. In no case
is the mortgagee claiming present property subordinated to a purchase
money interest which is filed later.
I have dealt only with the conflict between the purchase money
secured party and the mortgagee. The same rules apply to the conflict
between the purchase money secured party and the owner of the land.
Here two situations must be distinguished: the owner may be a later
buyer of the premises or the debtor's lessor.
The basic rule governing the conflict between the fixture financer
and the buyer of the land is the first-to-file-or-record rule of subsection
(4) (b). The necessary filing must be a fixture filing, unless a remov-
able machine is involved, in which case a chattel filing would also
suffice if it were made before the goods became fixtures (section 9-
313(4) (c)). For removable consumer appliances, no filing is required.
This last rule appears to make sense in terms of the purpose of
freeing the purchase money financer of replacement appliances from
the burden of filing.3 However, it is at variance with the rule of section
9-307(2), under which a buyer of consumer goods for his own personal,
family, or household purposes prevails over the secured party, unless
the secured party has filed a financing statement. No reason appears
why the buyer of an appliance as a part of a house should receive less
protection than a buyer of the appliance alone.
The situation of a landlord, who under his lease becomes the owner
of the fixtures installed by his tenant, vis-a-vis the fixture financer, is
governed primarily by subsection (4) (a). The fixture financer prevails
if he has fixture filed either before affixation or within the following
ten days. The two exceptions in favor of removable machines and remov-
able consumer appliances are also applicable (section 9-313(4) (c)). Thus
the landlord is treated like the prior mortgagee, unless under the lease
the tenant has the right to remove the fixtures. Then the landlord has
no claim to them, and the fixture financer prevails over him even if his
interest is completely unperfected (section 9-313(5) (b)).
A word must be said about the conflict between a purchase money
financer and a lien creditor. The equities of a creditor are far lower
than those of a mortgagee. To prevail over a lien creditor, the financer
need only perfect his interest "by any method permitted by this Article"
(section 9-313(4) (d)). Although he has supplied a fixture which is not
a removable machine, he is still protected against the lien creditor by a
chattel filing. The reason for his protection is that he is often unable
to know whether the buyer will affix the goods or use them as chat-
3Comment 4(d) to Section 9-313.
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tels. Hence a chattel filing is not in and of itself an indication of lack
of seriousness on the part of the secured party.
Comment 4(c) expresses the hope that the purchase money security
interest in a fixture, which is mistakenly filed in the chattel records,
will be valid in bankruptcy under the rule, devised for chattels, which
declares void as against the trustee any transfer or security interest
which would be void against a lien creditor under state law. The ques-
tion is one of bankruptcy law, upon which the draftsmen of the revision
were powerless to do more than express an opinion. I fully concur in
their views, because fixtures are not necessarily realty for all purposes.
The fact that a security interest can arise in them under Article Nine,
and that they can be repossessed like chattels in ease of non-payment,
without complying with the formalities of a realty foreclosure, is proof
of their hybrid character. When the Bankruptcy Act sets up the dicho-
tomy of real and personal property, it leaves open the question whether
fixtures should be considered as one or the other for each particular pur-
pose. Surely, if fixtures are chattels under state law for purposes of
perfection (though not for priority over prior mortgagees), they should
be considered such under the trustee's power of avoidance, which is
exercised by him in his capacity as representative of the bankrupt's
creditors.
d) PRIORITY OF CONSTRUCTION MORTGAGES
Construction mortgages have been singled out in section 9-313(6)
for a special priority. They are prior to purchase money interests in
fixtures, even if the fixture financer files within ten days after the affix-
ation, subject only to the limitation that the affixation take place
"before the completion of the construction."
The need for this priority stems from the custom (or perhaps merely
the desire) of banks which finance construction to put up money not only
for the buildings themselves, but also, especially in cases of home con-
struction, for the fixtures to be installed therein. The construction
mortgagee is a prior mortgagee, but unlike other prior mortgagees he
relies on the future fixtures at the time he executes his mortgage. He
therefore has a much stronger right to them than the ordinary mort-
gagee, who claims future fixtures merely as an added precaution.
The old Code's failure to recognize the construction mortgagee's
special situation is probably its greatest shortcoming. It allows a con-
tractor or owner, who has obtained construction financing for fixtures,
to buy them later subject to a purchase money interest which gains an
automatic priority, without having to be filed. To the extent that this
rule influences banks in their lending, it tends to make them finance
each stage of the construction (and especially the last one, in which
most fixtures are installed) after it has taken place instead of before.
Under this form of financing the bank can rely on the files, because
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to the extent that it makes a future advance it is protected by subsection
(4) (c) if the purchase money security interest is unfiled. The conse-
quence is the socially undesirable one of dampening construction financ-
ing.
Under the new rules, the important question is: when is a mort-
gage a "construction mortgage"? From the definition in section 9-313(1)
(c), it appears that the "recorded writing" must indicate that a con-
struction mortgage is involved. And there is the substantive requirement
that the mortgage have been executed "for the construction of an im-
provement on land."
From these words it clearly appears that no distinction can be made
between a construction mortgage and an improvement mortgage. Wheth-
er a structure is being created from its very foundation or merely being
improved, a mortgage to finance the work is a "construction mortgage."
The distinguishing feature of a construction mortgage is that an
improvement on land is "constructed." If the improvement consists
merely of the installation of a new fixture or set of fixtures, the interest
is a purchase money security interest, not a construction mortgage. Under
a true construction mortgage, labor is performed which is substantial
in relation to the value of the fixtures installed.
An important limitation placed upon the priority of construction
mortgagees stems from the fact that under subsection (4) (c), purchase
money financers of readily removable machines have claims which are
prior even to construction mortgagees. This priority is achieved by
perfecting the purchase money interest before the machines become
fixtures "by any method permitted by this Article," which gives a
choice between a chattel filing and a fixture filing.
The reason for this exception for removable machines lies in the
fact that construction mortgagees do not customarily finance the ac-
quisition of machinery. They were therefore willing to relinquish their
priority in relation to this type of fixture. In so doing, however, they
set a trap for the unwary chattel financer: if he doesn't file before the
machines become fixtures, he loses his priority. He does not enjoy the
usual ten-day grace period. This burden of immediate filing is an exces-
sive one for three reasons: first, the financer is often an assignee who
buys the contract some time after the sale of the machine and at a time
when it is still unfiled; second, he may not know, and should not be put
under a duty to inquire, whether the machine was sold for installation
in a factory still under construction; and third, the construction mort-
gagee places no reliance on the machine when he advances funds for
the construction, and hence has no legitimate complaint if a filing takes
place within the usual grace period.
Domestic appliances are treated differently from machines. The
subordination of construction mortgagees to purchase money financers
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does not apply to domestic appliances unless they are replacements, but
it applies to machines even though they are originals. No financer of an
appliance enjoys a priority, because appliances installed during construc-
tion are necessarily original appliances. The different rule for appliances
is based on the practice of banks of financing all appliances installed
in a home, including those that are readily removable.
In summary, there are three types of fixtures of interest to a con-
struction mortgagee: fixtures in general, with respect to which he has
priority over the later purchase money financer; readily removable
machines, with respect to which it is the financer who has priority if he
chattel files or fixture files before affixation; and domestic appliances
of all sorts, with respect to which the construction mortgagee again pre-
vails, provided the appliances were installed during construction.
A question which is likely to occur often, especially in the case of
home construction is: when precisely does the construction terminate?
Almost all readily removable appliances are installed in homes after the
roof has been completed. Should the construction mortgagee's priority
depend upon whether the window frames remain to be painted when
the appliances are put into place? Emphatically not. Doubts about when
the construction ends can be intelligently resolved only by asking wheth-
er the appliances are included in the plans on the basis of which the
construction mortgagee extended credit. However, the purchase money
financer also needs protection when a fixture is to be installed in a
house which appears completed. With his interest in mind, I would
say that if the owner has already moved into the house, although some
details remain to be completed, the construction mortgagee's priority
is cut off. There may be some mixed situations, in which a fixture
financed by the bank under the construction plan is nevertheless in-
stalled after the appearance of a completed building has been created.
No hard and fast rule can be laid down for these difficult cases. The
judge will have to make an equitable determination on the basis of the
special facts of each case.
Viewing the new rules on construction mortgages in economic
terms, it can easily be seen that a lot of fixture financing business, which
under the old Code is carried on by finance companies, will, under the
revision, go to the mortgage banks. It appears that when the old version
was drafted the finance companies exerted considerable influence, and
that the mortgage banks have made their power felt much more effec-
tively in the course of the revision. The result is not one-sided, however.
The fixture financing business was divided up more or less fairly: the
finance companies will do the lending on machines in newly built fac-
tories and offices, and the mortgage banks will get the appliance business
for new homes. But while the mortgage banks receive their priority
as a direct consequence of the recordation of their construction mortgage,
the finance companies attain theirs only by a very prompt filing "before
the goods become fixtures" and without the usual ten-day grace period,
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Their priority is therefore much more vulnerable than that of the banks.
It is this vulnerability which is unfair. As against both construction and
non-construction prior mortgagees, the financer of removable machines
should be given the choice between chattel filing within ten days from
the date of delivery or fixture filing within ten days from the date of
affixation.
Rights of Creditors Making Future Advances
The old Article Nine expressly allows a future advance clause to be
contained in a security agreement (section 9-204(5)). The effect of
such a clause is to save the parties the trouble of making a new security
agreement every time fresh capital is advanced to the debtor. But no
rules are provided to resolve the conflict that can arise between the
creditor who claims to be secured in his future advance, and another
secured creditor, a buyer of the encumbered goods or a judicial lien
creditor. Answers to these problems are given by the new Article Nine
in sections 9-312(7), 9-307(3) and 9-301(4).
a) CONFLICT WITH OTHER SECURED CREDITOR
The conflict between one secured creditor who has made a future
advance and a conflicting secured party is resolved very simply by the
rule of priority in time of filing or perfection. But is the priority given
even in the case in which the security agreement contained no future
advance clause? Here a distinction has to be made. If the security
interest is perfected by possession, as in the case of a field warehouse,
the creditor's possession gives constructive notice of the content of the
security agreement and no more. A later competing creditor takes free
of a. future advance which, since it is not stipulated in the original
security agreement, would have to be contained in a later one, which
could be verbal and even implied, under section 9-203(1). On the other
hand, if the security interest is perfected by filing, the filing constitutes
notice, not only of the agreement itself, but also, under the system of
notice filing, of any future agreement entered into with respect to the
described collateral. Hence the first secured creditor who has filed a
financing statement prevails over the second one, whether his future
advance is made under cover of a clause in his agreement or by virtue
of a new agreement which, in this case, would have to be in writing,
but need not be filed. This rule is in sharp contrast to the one which
prevails in the field of real estate mortgages, where a first mortgagee
prevails only if he makes his advance without notice of the existence
of a second mortgage or pursuant to commitment. 4 If he makes it with
notice and voluntarily, he loses. But the Article Nine secured party
prevails over a later secured lender even in this situation.
'See, G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF MORTGAGES, § 119 (2d ed. 1970).
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b) CONFLICT WITH BUYER
The rule for buyers is more complex. The concern is with bulk
transferees only, since buyers in the ordinary course take free of any
security interest created by their seller. The rule which protects bulk
transferees, contained in section 9-307(3), is mainly designed to prevent
fraud. Indeed, it would be fraudulent for a secured creditor to make a
future advance to his debtor, secured by inventory or equipment which
he knew the debtor had already sold. Therefore, the basic principle is
that the secured creditor loses against the buyer, if he knew of the
sale at the time he made his future advance, unless he made it pursuant
to a commitment. This rule did not seem strong enough to the drafts-
men because of the difficulty of proving knowledge. They established
that if the creditor made his advance, without a prior commitment,
more than forty-five days after the sale, he should also lose against the
buyer. In other words, after forty-five days, the creditor is irrebutably
presumed to have acquired knowledge of the sale.
C) CONFLICT WITH LIEN CREDITOR
The position of a lien creditor is much weaker than that of a
buyer. Under the rule in section 9-301(4), there is nothing to prevent
the debtor and his secured creditor from conspiring, during a full forty-
five days after the lien is obtained, to deprive the lien creditor of the
value of the property covered by his lien. After that period there is
no presumption of knowledge (as in the case of a buyer), but the lien
creditor carries the burden of proving that the secured party knew of
his lien when he made his advance without prior commitment. Why so
harsh a rule? The answer, found in the Comment, lies in the fact that
the Tax Lien Act of 19665 gives a priority to the federal tax lien over
future advances, unless the secured creditor would, under state law,
prevail for a full forty-five days over lien creditors, regardless of know-
ledge of the lien. The culprit is therefore Congress, for having passed a
statute which tempts state legislatures to make an unjust rule with
respect to all lien creditors, so that its financing agencies may prevail
over the Internal Revenue Service with respect to future advances. Now
that the futility of the federal rule is apparent, its repeal or amendment
is likely. When this happens, state legislatures should change section
9-301(4), and enact a more sensible rule, such as that embodied in section
9-307(3) on purchasers.
The Financing Statement
The financing statement is an abbreviated version of the security
agreement, which, if filed and indexed under the name of the debtor,
will provide the person who searches the files with knowledge that the
assets described in the statement have been assigned (in the case of
5INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 6323(d) (2).
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accounts or chattel paper) or transferred as security. Matters relating
to the debt, as opposed to the security interest, do not appear in the
financing statement. The amount of the debt, its maturity, the rate
of interest, the creditor's right to accelerate payment, and his right
to be free from defenses of the account debtor are not intended to
appear in the financing statement, as the form given in section 9-402(3)
indicates. The searcher may obtain this information by making an
inquiry of the secured party. If he obtains no response, he may have
the debtor acquire this information for his benefit from the secured
party under section 9-208.
a) DEBTOR'S NAME
One of the most important features of a financing statement is the
debtor's name. If the debtor is an individual doing business under a
trade name, must the trade name be used? If the debtor is a partnership,
must the names of all the partners appear on the financing statement?
The answers to these two previously vexing questions are given in the
new Article Nine. Section 9-402(7) provides that in the case of an
individual, the individual name must be used; and in the case of a
partnership, the partnership name must be used. Trade names and
names of partners are irrelevent. But what if they are used anyway,
without the legally required name? Could it be argued that this is a
minor error which is not seriously misleading, making the filing valid
under section 9-402(5)? The answer should be in the negative, because
a reasonable man searching the files would not look under these irrele-
vant names. However, if the searcher looks under these irrelevant
names because he is acting under the same mistake as the person who
filed, or for some other reason, he should be precluded from asserting
superior rights (see, section 9-401(2) for an appropriate analogy).
b) DEBTOR'S SIGNATURE
The old Article Nine provides that both the debtor and the secured
party must sign the financing statement. The requirement makes ap-
parent good sense, since the names of both the debtor and the secured
party must appear on the statement. It is paradoxical, however, that
under the Statute of Frauds provision relating to the security agreement
(section 9-203(1) (b)), only the debtor's signature is needed. It hardly
makes sense to require more formalities for the financing statement than
for the security agreement itself. The rule is also a dangerous pitfall for
persons whose legal tradition is not one of double signing, as in the
Civil Law, but of signature only by the transferor or person to be
charged. Under the new Article Nine, the need for the secured party's
signature has been done away with. Only that of the debtor is required
(section 9-402(1)).
However, there are four cases, listed in section 9-402(2), in which
the secured party's signature is needed instead of that of the debtor.
[Vol. 34
17
Headrick: The New Article Nine Of The Uniform Commercial Code: An Introduction And Critique (Part II)
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1973
THE NEW ARTICLE NINE
They are cases of refiling and of filing with respect to proceeds. And
under subsection (4), in the case of an amendment to the financing
statement, both signatures are still required to prevent either party
from prejudicing the rights of the other.
c) CHANGES OF DEBTOR'S NAME
There are various cases where refilings are required. Most of them
will be dealt with later, under the heading of "Place of Filing." The
others are the filing of a continuation statement before the original
filing lapses (section 9-403(3)), the filing of a new financial statement
after it has lapsed (section 9-402(2) (c)), and the change in name of
the debtor. On this last point, an innovation in the new Code provides:
"Where the debtor so changes his name, . . . identity or corporate struc-
ture that a filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading, the
filing is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired
by the debtor more than four months after the change, unless a new
appropriate financing statement is filed before the expiration of that
time" (section 9-402(7)). Does this phrase require a refiling for the
continued perfection of a security interest which attached before the
debtor changed his name? The Comment supplies a clear negative an-
swer. Refiling is required only for after-acquired property which comes
into the debtor's possession more than four months after his change of
name. Why not require a refiling for continued perfection in the
original collateral as well? The rule which does not require refiling
gives the debtor a free hand to mislead third parties by changing his
name, so that under his new name his assets appear unencumbered in
the files; and the secured party can, with full knowledge of what is
going on, sit back without refiling. The opposite rule, which would re-
quire a refiling within four months of the change of name, might be
harsh if applied to all cases, since it would compel the secured party
to keep track of the debtor's name at all times. Therefore I would
advocate for old collateral, a four-month rule which begins to run, not
from the date of the change of name, but from the date on which the
secured party was informed of that change. The burden of proving his
knowledge and when he obtained it would rest on the competing party,
so that the first secured party would not be exposed to an unfair sur-
prise. Yet this proposed rule would avoid the scandal of a secured party
passively cooperating with his debtor's attempts to defraud later lenders
by changing his name.
d) CHANGE OF DEBTOR'S PERSON
The last sentence of section 9-402(7) contains a rule that runs par-
allel to the one on a change of name. It has to do with a change of the
debtor's person. Such a change takes place when the original debtor
sells the collateral to another, subject to the security interest. The buyer
in such a case usually assumes the debt. The new rule, which is really
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a corollary of the old section 9-306(2), provides: "A filed financing
statement remains effective with respect to collateral transferred by
the debtor even though the secured party knows of or consents to the
transfer" (section 9-402(7)). On behalf of this rule, it can be said
that it does not invite fraud to the same extent as the one on change
of name. Yet I would favor the opposite rule with a four-month period
to refile, because the security interest requires as much publicity in the
hands of the new debtor as in those of the old.
Does the rule on new debtors extend into the area of after-acquired
property? Suppose that a bulk sale of a business has been made, and
the buyer, who has assumed the seller's debts and security agreements,
buys new merchandise. Does the merchandise fall under the after-
acquired property clause of the inherited inventory security interest?
As between the buyer and the secured party it does, since the buyer is
now in privity of agreement with the secured party as a result of the
latter's acceptance of the delegation. Yet, in the words of the Comment,
it is "clear that a secured party could not be safe without a filing against
the new debtor."6 I agree, if by "not safe" the author of the Comment
means "not perfected." This conclusion is based on the analogy with a
change of name, for which a new filing is needed in relation to after-
acquired property. The same reason for a refiling exists in the case
of a change of debtor as in the case of a change of name; namely, the
need for publicity of security interests. Furthermore, the words "col-
lateral transferred by the debtor ' 7 (meaning the original debtor) can
be taken to exclude after-acquired collateral, which is not transferred by
him, but by the new debtor.
Thus, for after-acquired property, the secured party must refile
when there has been a change of debtor. Does he enjoy a four-month
period in which to refile, as in the case of a change of name? On this
point, the new Code is ambiguous. It lends itself to the argument that
no such a period is given, because section 9-402(7) contains side by side
two rules, one for the change of name and the other for the change
of debtor, and it gives a four-month period in the first case and not in
the second. Yet, I would subscribe to the opposite view, which draws
upon the analogy between the two cases. If a four-month grace period
is given for refiling in the case of a change of name, such a period should
also exist in the case of a transfer to another debtor. Both events are
beyond the creditor's control, and be may not be informed about them
the very instant they take place. It would be unfair to require an
immediate refiling with the consequence, in most cases, of a gap in
perfection.
OGeneral Comment, paragraph 1-10.
'These words appear in the last sentence of Section 9-402(7), which has to do with
change of debtor.
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Duration of Filing and Lapse
a) DURATION OF FILING
Under the old Article Nine, a financing statement is good for sixty
days after the maturity date stated thereon and, if no maturity date
appears, for a period of five years (section 9-403(2)). Since a maturity
date is not intended to appear on a financing statement in the first
place, this rule makes little sense. Any creditor who wishes to avoid
lapse after sixty days from maturity can circumvent the rule by simply
not stating a maturity date.
This useless rule has been abolished and in its place a five-year
period of effectiveness has been given to all financing statements with
but two exceptions, both of which have the effect of prolonging, not
shortening, the duration of the filing. A very generous exception is
provided for transmission utilities, the financing statements of which
remain effective indefinitely until a termination statement is filed (sec-
tion 9-403(6)). A less generous one is provided where a financing state-
ment lapses during the course of an insolvency proceeding. Here the
creditor is excused from not filing a continuation statement until sixty
days after the proceeding is finished. He might neglect to refile, in
the belief that the debtor will receive a discharge, and then find himself
unperfected if the discharge is not granted.
The advantage of a uniform five-year period of effectiveness is
that it allows the filing officer to clear the files every five years, if he
arranges them chronologically. What should be done with the two
exceptions? For transmitting utilities, a separate filing system will have
to be set up. And for the sake of insolvency proceedings, the duty is
imposed on filing officers by section 9-403(3) to keep the files or micro-
film copies for a full year after lapse. When a continuation statement
is filed, the filing officer must remove the financing statement from
the year of its original filing, attach it to the continuation statement,
and place both in the files of the current year (section 9-403(3)).
Why did the Review Committee make an exception for transmitting
utilities and not for other corporations which are also apt to be long-
term debtors? The General Comment (paragraph 1-4) gives the impres-
sion that this question was hotly debated. The policy question is whether
the filing officers should be inconvenienced by having to go over their
files one by one each year to see which ones have lapsed or been term-
inated, or whether the bankers and other lenders should have to set up
files of their own to remind themselves of financing statements which
are about to lapse. The victory scored by filing officers will probably
mean that the files will be less cluttered and easier to search.
b) EFFECT OF LAI'SE
The effect of lapse is unclear under the existing Code, except for
interests which arise after lapse, in which case it is self-evident that the
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lapsed financing statement has no prejudicial effect. The doubts arise
in the case of pre-lapse junior secured creditors, pre-lapse lien creditors,
and pre-lapse buyers outside the ordinary course of business. The doubts
are easiest to resolve the junior secured party. If his interest is per-
fected, he prevails over the creditor whose filing has lapsed, by appli-
cation of the principle that a perfected secured creditor prevails over
one who is not perfected. This point is explicitly made in Comment 3
to the old section 9-403. As to pre-lapse judicial lienors, the solution
under the old Code is also clear for those who were foolish enough to
consult the files before obtaining their liens. Such creditors would have
knowledge of the lapsed security interest and would lose under the
old section 9-301(1) (b). The same is true for the pre-lapse bulk buyer
who consulted the files before he bought. But if the judicial lienor or
bulk buyer did not consult the files, there is no satisfactory answer
provided by the old Code. Literally, they would lose under the old
Code in spite of the lapse, since they acquired their rights after the
now lapsed security interest became perfected. But such a rule is
extremely unfair, since, as between the secured party who allowed his
statement to lapse and the innocent judicial lienor or bulk buyer, the
equities are heavily on the side of the latter.
The new Code gives a simple and fair rule on the effect of lapse.
Section 9-403(2) states that "if the security interest becomes unperfected
upon lapse, it is deemed to have been unperfected as against a person
who became a purchaser or lien creditor before lapse." Thus all pre-
lapse and all post-lapse judicial lienors and purchasers, i.e., secured
parties and buyers, prevail over the creditor who let his statement lapse.
Therefore, creditors whose loans mature after more than five years or
who extended their loans beyond that time, should keep accurate records
of when their filings lapse.
Place of Filing
There are three levels at which the question of where to file a
financing statement can arise: the state level (where to file within the
state), the national level (in which state to file), and the international
level.
a) PLACE OF FILING ON THE STATE LEVEL
There have been only two changes in the new Article Nine on
where to file within a state. A reference is made to the greater number
of cases in which a realty filing is required: for fixtures, uncut timber,
extracted minerals, and accounts arising from the sale thereof, but not
crop mortgages, since for crops perfection is by means of a chattel
filing. The rule for transmitting utilities is stated, to the effect that
these companies need make only one filing per state for all of their
chattels and fixtures, in the office of the secretary of state (section 9-
401(5)). Apart from that, the place to file within the state depends
on the "alternative" chosen by the state in question.
[Vol. 34
21
Headrick: The New Article Nine Of The Uniform Commercial Code: An Introduction And Critique (Part II)
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1973
THE NEW ARTICLE NINE
b) PLACE OF FILING ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL
The rules of the old Article Nine on the place to file on the national
level were so carelessly drafted that they were difficult to apply in a
great many cases. Instead of facing the issue of where to file as such,
the draftsmen began with the generalization that "this Article applies
so far as concerns any personal property and fixtures within the juris-
diction of this state" (section 9-102(1)), then tried to create exceptions
to it. These exceptions are framed as choice of law rules on the law
applicable to the "validity and perfection," or, at times, due to wabbling
draftsmanship, merely the "validity" of the security interest (section
9-103, especially subsection (3)).
There are separate rules for ordinary goods, accounts, and general
intangibles, with which mobile goods are lumped together. There is
something wrong with every rule.
The problem with the rule on ordinary goods is that one cannot
tell for sure what it is. It is unclear whether one should apply section
9-103(3), which would make sense, but speaks of "validity" instead of
"perfection"; or whether one should fall back on the generalization of
section 9-102(1), leaving unanswered the problem of goods which are
moved into another jurisdiction.
The old rule for accounts is that the filing must take place in the
state where the assignor keeps his records. The difficulty with it is
that in the case of a large corporation, the searcher does not always
know which of its many offices is its central accounting office.
The place of filing for general intangibles and mobile goods is the
debtor's chief place of business. But that test leaves in doubt the case
of a corporation having its plant in one location and its executive office
in another.
1) New place of filing for ordinary goods
In the new Article Nine, the generalization has been removed from
section 9-102, and section 9-103 has been completely rewritten. The lan-
guage used is overtechnical, but the meaning comes through. The place
to file for ordinary goods as well as documents is the state "where the
collateral is when the last event occurs on which is based the assertion
that the security interest is perfected or unperfected." That is, the
state where the collateral is located at the time a conflict arises with
respect to it. There is an exception when the goods are intended to be
moved to another jurisdiction, though it is limited to purchase money
interests. Under this exception the right state for filing is the state
of destination, and the interest is perfected from its inception if the filing
takes place within the relevant grace period (ten days for ordinary pur-
chase money interests; twenty-one days for trust receipt transactions)
and the goods arrive at their destination within thirty days from the
time of attachment.
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There is also a requirement of refiling and a four-month grace period
in which to do it, for goods moved from one state to another after a
security interest in them has been perfected. As in the case of other
refilingss the four-rnonth period is a compromise between the need to
protect the creditor, who cannot be required to refile right away, and
the need to protect competing good faith parties, all too often buyers,
whose search of the files in the state where the goods are located would
reveal nothing until the secured creditor refiled.
There is another, more subtle and more just, way of resolving this
conflict of interest. It consists in giving the secured party a short
period for refiling, say ten days from the time he learns of the removal,
but in no case to exceed four months from the date of the removal itself.
This solution would avoid the unfortunate situation which can arise
under the Code, of the secured party whiting out his full four months
and then, after the goods have been sold, repossessing them from a bona
fide purchaser who would have been protected had the creditor promptly
refiled. It would also share the virtue of the Code rule, of avoiding an
indefinite and in some cases very prolonged period of uncertainty. The
bona fide purchaser who bought the goods before reperfection within
the four-month period would have the heavy burden of proving when
the secured creditor obtained knowledge of the removal, but he would
at least have a chance to vindicate a just solution.
Returning to the Code rule, what is the solution for the buyer who
makes his purchase during the four-month period, when the creditor
fails to file before its expiration? Under the old Article Nine anyone
who purchases or levies on the goods during that time loses to the
secured party, even if the secured party never reperfects his interest.
The new Article Nine takes the opposite view when it says that if reper-
fection has not taken place during the four months, the security interest
"is deemed to have been unperfected as against a person who became a
purchaser after removal" (section 9-103(1) (d) (i)). Thus persons who pur-
chase during the four-month period take free of the security interest
if the secured party fails to refile during that period. This change is
but one aspect of the new Code's tougher policy on secured creditors
who do not perfect their interests.
The lien creditor is left out of this scheme, since he is not a "pur-
chaser." It is clear that if the secured party reperfects during the four
months following removal of the goods, the creditor's lien will be sub-
ordinate to the security interest. But what if there is no reperfection
during that period? Does the lien creditor then prevail? The proper
inference to draw is that since the security interest is deemed unper-
fected as against a purchaser, it is deemed perfected as against a lien
8See, section 9-402(7) on change of name and alternative subsection (3) of section
9-401 on change of county.
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creditor. Therefore, the secured party prevails over the lien creditor,
whether the lien is obtained during or after the four months, even if the
secured party completely fails to reperfect. This inference is justified
by the fact that the lien creditor is not a reliance creditor. He has a
right to insist on perfection as proof of seriousness, but not as a form
of publicity; hence, the filing in the jurisdiction of origin is enough to
subordinate him. The consequence of all this in bankruptcy is that the
secured party need have no fear of bankruptcy in the case of removal
of goods, even if he fails to reperfect, since the trustee in bankruptcy,
under section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act,9 has no greater rights than
a lien creditor would have under state law.
There is also a problem with purchasers in the case of removal of
goods and failure of the secured party to file within the allotted four
months. What if a purchaser knows at the time he buys the goods
that they have been wrongfully removed from the state where an
interest in them is perfected and are sold in violation of the rights of
the secured party? A literal reading of section 9-103(d) of the new
Code would allow the buyer to prevail if the secured party, through
ignorance of the removal or for some other excusable reason, had failed
to refile in the jurisdiction in which the goods were bought. Actually,
however, this unjust result need not be reached, since a buyer who is
not in the ordinary course must qualify under section 9-301(c) which,
even under the new Code, requires that he be ignorant of the unper-
fected security interest in order to prevail over the secured party.
2) New place of filing for intangible property and mobile goods
The differing rules of the old Article Nine on accounts, general
intangibles, and mobile goods have been consolidated into a single rule
by the new Article: "The law (including the conflict of laws rules) of
the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located governs the perfection
and the effect of perfection or non-perfection of the security interest"
(section 9-103(3)(b)). The allusion to the conflict of laws rules echoes
the technique of the Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws, and has the
defect of not stating which conflict of laws rule a court sitting at the
location of the debtor must apply.10 Taken literally, there is nothing in
the rule which would prevent a court sitting in the state of the debtor's
location from deciding for itself that the law governing the perfection
of security interests in accounts is, say, the "situs" of the account, or the
assignee's domicile or any other place. But the intent is, clearly, to have
the domestic law of the assignor's location govern the perfection of
the security interest, and hence the reference to its conflict of laws
rules has to be overlooked. The place to file with respect to a security
interest in accounts, mobile goods, and general intangibles, is therefore
-11 U.S.C. § 110.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, ch. 9, topic 2 at 17 (P.O.D. III 1969).
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the debtor's location. By location is meant, as subsection (3) (d) ex-
plains, place of business, but if the debtor has more than one such place,
his chief executive office, and if he has no place of business, his residence.
A change in the debtor's location is expressly contemplated by sec-
tion 9-103(3) (e). This rule is an adaptation of the one on removal of
ordinary goods. The secured party must refile at the debtor's new lo-
cation within four months from the date of the change. If he fails to
do so, he is subordinated to "any person who became a purchaser after
the change," i.e., to a buyer of mobile equipment and to any person who
obtained a security interest in accounts, general intangibles, and mobile
equipment, at any time during or after those four months, but not to a
lien creditor.
Finally, the place to file a security interest in chattel paper (if such
an interest is perfected by filing) is also at the debtor's location, as
section 9-103(4) makes clear. The analogy of chattel paper to accounts
is certainly closer than to ordinary goods, which is the way the old Code
treats chattel paper for lack of a specific rule. The result is different
every time the debtor keeps his chattel paper in his local offices instead
of at his chief execuive office. It is certainly easier for the secured
party, as well as the person searching the files, to refer to just this one
place, rather than to search the many states where the debtor may
have local offices where he keeps chattel paper.
C) PLACE OF FILING ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
On the international level, there is only one rule expressly given
in section 9-103, which relates to accounts, chattel paper, general intang-
ibles, and mobile goods. It is an exception to the usual place-of-filing
rule. Thus, the place to file in other situations is governed by the same
rule on the international level as on the national level.
For accounts, chattel paper, general intangibles, and mobile goods,
the special rule is given by section 9-103(3) (c). Had it not been made,
the form of perfection used in the foreign country could have been
recognized, and any assignment of accounts, chattel paper, or general
intangibles or any security interest in mobile goods would be considered
perfected in the United States if the creditor had taken the appropriate
steps under the law of the debtor's location to perfect his interest. How-
ever, this approach, which is the one used for ordinary goods, was re-
jected. In its place, section 9-103(3) (c) gives various rules for perfec-
tion in the United States, which have nothing to do with whether the
relevant security interest is perfected under foreign law, except that
if the foreign law provides for perfection by filing, then that perfection
will be recognized.
There are three ways in which a security interest in accounts,
chattel paper, general intangibles, and mobile goods can be perfected
in the United States when the location of the debtor is in a foreign
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country. These are: (1) as already stated, recognition of a filing in
the foreign country as a form of perfection; (2) filing in the jurisdiction
in the United States in which the debtor has his principal branch office,
assuming he has an American branch; and (3) in the case of accounts
and general intangibles representing a right to the payment of money,
notification of the account debtor. The account debtor has to be an
American for this third rule to operate. If he is a foreigner, the question
of the perfection of the interest would arise in a foreign court, as com-
peting parties asserted rights to the payment owed by him.
The possibility of filing at the debtor's main executive office in the
United States is a partial attempt to remedy the impossibility of per-
fecting security interests in accounts, chattel paper, general intangibles,
and mobile goods when the law of the debtor's location does not provide
for perfection by filing. For mobile goods, filing is the only alternative.
This means that if the foreign debtor is located in a jurisdiction which
does, not consider a security interest as perfected by a local filing when
the goods are outside of its territory, then a filing in the state of the
main office of its U.S. branch is the only possibility for perfection. Of
course, if it has no branch office, perfection of the security interest
simply cannot be attained. There is no way in which the draftsmen
could have remedied this situation. The source of the difficulty lies
with the foreign law, which fails to have a special rule for mobile goods
allowing perfection at the debtor's location, no matter where the goods
are taken. The same can be said of chattel paper, whenever the foreign
law does not allow perfection by filing.
In the case of accounts and general intangibles for the payment of
money, the choices are wider. If perfection by filing is impossible at
the assignor's domicile, and if he has no branch office in the U.S., the
assignment can be perfected by notifying the account debtors. This is
true even if under the law of the debtor's location, the assignment
would be regarded as unperfected, since the rule on perfection by notifi-
cation is not a conflict of laws rule, but a rule of United States law.
There is but one point in the system devised by section 9-103(3) (c)
which raises a doubt in my mind, and that is the fact that we recognize
the foreign form of perfection for assignments of accounts if that form
is filing. Why recognize any foreign type of perfection when the account
debtor is in this country? It would have been simpler and better to
eliminate this possibility for accounts (though preserving it for mobile
goods) and to decide that the form of perfection for accounts owing
by American businessmen to foreigners is notification to them with no
alternative. When there is one system of perfection, there is also one
way of resolving priorities. When two systems compete with each other
it becomes, to say the least, extremely difficult. Moreover, prospective
reliance creditors, in this case prospective assignees, have to search both
systems to assure themselves of a priority, and that, if the prospective
assignee is an American lender, requires knowing foreign law.
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Perfection by Indication on a Certificate of Title in Multi-state Cases
The old Article Nine has a very simple rule on perfection by indi-
cation on a certificate of title in multi-state cases: "the perfection is
governed by the law of the jurisdiction which issued the certificate"
(section 9-103(4)). A good many consequences can be derived from this
statement, some of which are made explicit by the revision. But an
equal number of consequences are unpredictable."
There are three situations dealt with by the detailed rules of the
new Article Nine: first, where the goods are moved from a non-cer-
tificate of title state into a certificate state; second, where they are
moved between the same two states, but in the opposite direction; and
third, where they are moved from one certificate state into another. The
case in which they go from a non-certificate state into another non-
certificate state is governed by the general rule on ordinary goods, dis-
cussed earlier.
The first case is that in which goods on which an interest is per-
fected in a non-certificate of title state are moved into a certificate
state. Suppose that because of the debtor's false declaration that the
goods are unmortgaged, a clean certificate is issued for them. The
general rule is that the secured party must reperfect within four months,
as in the case of ordinary goods (section 9-103 (2) (c)). But there is an
obstacle to reperfection, which is the fact that it can only be done on
the certificate of title, which is not in the secured party's possession.
The Comment suggests that he can repossess the goods. But is that true
where removal was not made an event of default in the security agree-
ment and the debtor has not yet defaulted in his payments? In such a
situation, the only remedy is to seek an injunction to compel the debtor
to surrender the certificate of title long enough to allow the secured
party to note his interest on it. The moral of this story is that a creditor
secured by goods which in some other states are subject to a certificate
of title law ought to make removal into those states an event of default.
He can then either repossess or ask for the certificate of title under
threat of repossession.
What is the situation of third parties (mainly buyers and subsequent
secured creditors) who have relied on the clean certificate of title before
the secured party reperfected his intrest? The Committee worked out a
compromise between protecting the secured party for a full four months,
as in other cases, and protecting all purchasers who rely on the certificate.
Purchasers were divided into two classes: dealers and others. Dealers
are subject to the security interest; non-dealers, including lenders, are
protected to the extent they relied on the clean certificate. They take
free of the security interest, even during the first four months following
"The old as well as the new law is analyzed in Rohner, Autos, Title Certificates, and
U.C.C. 9-108, 27 THE BUSINEss LAWYER 1177 (1972).
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removal. Hence the secured party is very seriously exposed. Perhaps
to protect him, his state legislature should pass a certificate of title law.
But the dealer in the jurisdiction of removal is also very seriously
exposed. His only way of making sure that he is not receiving a "hot"
car, is not to buy it unless the certificate of title is more than four
months old.
In the second case, the goods are moved from a certificate of title
state into one which does not have a certificate law. The security
interest is perfected by notation on the certificate (section 9-302(3) (b)).
The owner registers them in the new jurisdiction, then sells them. Sec-
tion 9-103(2)(b) gives no less than three different periods for reper-
fection. The general rule is the four-month period from the date of
removal. But if the goods are not registered until after that four-month
period has elapsed, the secured party need not reperfect until they are
registered. On the other hand, if the secured party surrenders the
certificate of title before the four-month period is over, he loses his
perfected status, and hence he must file his security interest before he
surrenders the certificate.
In the third case, in which the goods are removed from one certifi-
cate of title state into another, there is likely to be no problem, since
the public official of the state of removal will copy the notation of the
security interest from the old certificate and make it appear on the
new one. But there might be cases of fraud, in which the debtor, for
example, obtains a new certificate of title from the state of origin by
falsely swearing that he has lost the old one and that the goods are
unencumbered. In such cases, the certificate of title in the new juris-
diction would be issued clean. The same rules would govern as if the
goods had come from a non-certificate state. Non-dealers who purchase
the goods are protected in their reliance on the certificate, but dealers
are not protected until four months have passed without the secured
party having reperfected.
Other Conflict of Lauws Problems
In speaking of where to perfect a security interest, the problem of
what law is applicable to perfect such an interest was discussed. Two
questions remain. What law is applicable to the validity of a security
interest? What law is applicable to its foreclosure?
a) LAW APPLICABLE TO VALIDITY OF SECURITY AGREEMENT
The old Article Nine equates and confuses validity and perfection
by making the same law applicable to both. But the policies underlying
them are entirely different, since validity has to do with the relation-
ship of the contracting parties among themselves, and is a matter of
contract law; whereas perfection is a means of determining third party
rights, and the basic principle iq consequently the law of the situs.
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Conflict of laws questions relating to the validity of security agree-
ments are not likely to arise very often because the U.C.C. is in force
in all states but one (Louisiana) and all territories but one (Puerto
Rico), and where the same law is in force in both jurisdictions there
is no true conflict of laws.
However, there can easily be conflicts between jurisdictions gov-
erned by the U.C.C. and jurisdictions outside its scope (including foreign
countries) because the U.C.C. has comparatively few rules of invalidity
while in other jurisdictions there may still persist rules of the kind swept
aside by section 9-205 or the requirement that the security interest be
in a notarized instrument or be filed for its validity. Under the new
Article Nine, such conflicts are resolved by section 1-105, which contains
two rules: first, if the parties have chosen the applicable law by a clause
in the contract, that clause will be given effect, if the transaction bears
a "reasonable relation" to the chosen law; and second, if there is no
choice-of-law clause in the contract, then the law of "this state" governs,
assuming there is an "appropriate relation" between this state and the
transaction. The expressions chosen are among the vaguest in the English
language, and their natural effect is to let the judge decide the conflict
according to his own enlightened, but unguided, judgment. In a word,
they are not rules of law at all. Were the rules meant to let modern
interest analysis take the place of rigid rules? If so, the second rule,
applicable in the absence of a choice-of-law clause, is badly framed,
and the first one is undesirable.
With respect to the first rule, there is no reason why the parties
should have any power at all to choose the law relating to the validity
of their agreement. Rules of invalidity are not foolish technicalities
that defeat legitimate commercial transactions; they are rules of public
policy, and their purpose in most cases, especially under the U.C.C., is
to protect the debtor from attempts by the creditor to take undue ad-
vantage of his superior bargaining position. The creditor in effect dic-
tates the contract. He should not also be allowed to dictate a choice-
of-law clause to get around the public policy provisions which are
intended to protect the debtor.
The second rule, which, in the absence of a choice of law clause.
dictates application of the law of "this state" assuming it bears an
"appropriate relation" to the transaction, is not a fair or correct way
to invite interest analysis, but seems instead designed to foster paro-
chialism. Many of the conflicts which will arise regarding questions
of validity will be conflicts with foreign nations. In this context the
prejudice of judges in favor of their own law needs to be reduced
rather than enhanced by legislation. True interest analysis calls for a
weighing of the interests of both jurisdictions, not merely of "this state,"
and requires the court to give effect to the law of the state which has,
in the words of the Restatement, Second, "the most significant relation-
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ship to the transaction and the parties."'1 These are the words which
should have been put into the Code.
One final question ol the law governing the validity of security
agreements. Do the Code conflicts rules apply to the possible invalidity
of the security agreement which is caused by the invalidity of the debt?
The question arises when the secured debt is a loan usurious under the
law of one state but not of another; or if the borrowed money was
intended, with full knowledge of the creditor, to be used in a way con-
trary to the public policy of one of two contending states, a situation
which, for example, might involve the purchase of gambling equipment.
Although such a case seems to involve the validity of the security agree-
ment, in reality the invalidity of the security stems from the invalidity
of the obligation secured. A security interest cannot exist by itself,
independent of an indebtedness. To exist, it needs the support of a
valid obligation. Therefore, all conflict of laws questions having to do
with the validity of the debt are outside of the Code, even though the
invalidity of the debt carries with it the invalidity of the security
agreement.
b) LAW APPLICABLE TO FORECLOSURE
Rules on foreclosure are typically rules of public policy against
which the parties are practically powerless to stipulate. The choice-
of-law rule is not one relating to the agreement, but one which will
decide which of these conflicting public policy rules will prevail over
the other. The Comment to section 9-103 of the old Code contains a
hint that the same law which governs questions of perfection also
governs default rights.13 There is nothing in the Code to support this
Comment. It is also wrong, since perfection and rights on default do
not involve the same policy considerations and cannot sensibly be
governed by the same rule. The new Comment has wisely deleted the
remark.
Unfortunately, the new Code does not have a sensible solution to
put in its place. The Reasons for Change in the Final Report and the
new Comment attempt to say that all questions of conflict of laws
except those relating to perfection are governed by section 1-105.14 This
ill-conceived section is indeed written in such a way as to cover, when
taken literally, not only questions of contract, but also questions of fore-
closure. It provides that the law chosen by the parties shall govern
their "rights and duties" and otherwise that "this Act applies to trans-
' RESTATEET (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 179 (P.O.D. Part I 1968).
"Comment 7, third paragraph, distinguished between questions of validity or formal
requisites, which are governed by the law applicable to contract questions, and ''other
matters (rights of third parties, rights on default and so on) which are governed by
this Article." See, G. GmmoRE, SECURITY INTERESTS § 44-11 (1965), and R.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 357 (1971).
"See, Comment and Reason for Change to section 9-103.
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actions bearing an appropriate relation to this state." But these words,
no matter how broad they may be in meaning, cannot cover the two
completely different problem areas of contracts and foreclosure. It is as
absurd to equate these two areas as it is to equate foreclosure and per-
fection, as the old Comment did. Validity of contract, perfection, and
formalities of foreclosure are three distinct areas, each with its own
policies and purposes, and neither one can be intelligently governed
by a conflicts rule conceived for the other.
Of course, it would have been much better to omit from the Code
any rule on conflict of laws, except in the area of perfection, than to
have the unfortunate rules of section 1-105. But since that section was
not removed by the Review Committee, the most that can be done
to save the situation is to attempt to cleanse it of absurdities by a hardy
process of interpretation. I do not hesitate to say that section 1-105 was
not drafted with the problems of foreclosure in mind, but merely those
of contract, and that the intention of the draftsmen would not be carried
out by extending it through a literal reading into an area for which it
was not conceived and is wholly unsuited.
Since section 1-105 should not apply to foreclosure questions, what
law should apply? In my opinion it should be the case law in this area
prior to the Code. The better view under the cases, not all of which
are in full harmony, calls for the application of the law of the state
where the debtor is located, since that state's interest in protecting him
usually outweighs the interest of any other state, such as the state
of the creditor's location or of the location of the goods at the time of
repossession or of the foreclosure sale.15
Foreclosure of the Security Interest
a) PERSONS ENTITLED TO NOTICE
Only one change was made in the new Article Nine in this area. It
relates to the technical question of who, apart from the debtor, is entitled
to notice of the time and place of foreclosure and of the intent of the
secured party to retain the collateral (if he has it) in satisfaction of the
debt. The old Article Nine requires that notice of these two facts be
given to all competing secured parties whose interest is filed or who
are known to the foreclosing secured party. As explained in the Reasons
for Change, this system required the foreclosing secured party to
search the files for every foreclosure and to keep track of any know-
ledge he receives of competing security interests. The authors of the
revision felt that this was too heavy a burden for the foreclosing party
to bear, and reduced the number of persons entitled to notice to those
15The cases are discussed and the view followed here is expressed in WEINTRAUB, SUpra
note 13 at 347-352.
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who had sent to the foreclosing party a written notice of their claim
to the collateral (sections 9-504(3) and 9-505(2)).
The new system seems built on the premise that the foreclosing
party is the one with priority. The Reason for Change to section 9-504
speaks of the party entitled to notice as a "junior secured party." That
is, of course, the usual case. But the reverse can also occur if, for
example, the debtor defaults to the junior party before he defaults to the
senior one. In this case the junior party would in all likelihood be the
one to take possession and attempt to sell or keep the collateral. The
senior secured party may have obtained his security interest prior to
the time when the junior party obtained his, so that his consultation
of the files at that time did not reveal the future existence of the
junior party. If the senior party has not found out about the junior
party through some other means, how will he be able to send him a
"written notice of his claim"? Under the new rules, if he does not do
so, he is not entitled to notice of the time and place of sale or of the
foreclosing party's intention to retain the collateral. The fact that he
has an action against him, to have him declared a constructive trustee
of the funds or of the retained collateral is no answer to the objection
that he also should have had notice, so as to protect his rights at an
early stage by enticing bidders for the-collateral.
To meet this objection, the new Article Nine should have provided,
as an exception to the general rule which it sets up, a requirement that
a junior secured party give notice to any senior party of whose existence
he had knowledge at the time he took possession of the collateral.
b) CREDITOR'S POWER OF SELF-HELP
During June, 1972, when the new Article Nine was being distributed
by the printer, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the companion cases
of Fuentes v. Shevin and Parham v. Cortese.16 The decisions in these
cases raise the important question whether the procedure of self-help
repossession, outlined in section 9-503 and left intact by the revision,
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The pro-
cedure used in the cases was not self-help, but rather a replevin action
begun by having the sheriff seize the collateral upon the posting of a
bond by the secured party, but without a hearing afforded to the debtor
until after the seizure. This replevin procedure must be used, according
to section 9-503, whenever seizure by self-help cannot take place without
a breach of the peace, and may be used in other cases too. The holding
of Fuentes is that the due process clause is violated when the debtor
is not afforded a hearing prior to the sheriff's seizure. It could easily
be argued that the court was chastizing the state for seizing property
without due process, and that there is nothing in the opinion to prevent
a private citizen from doing so, since the Constitution is addressed
.U.S ......... ,92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972).
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only to seizures by the state. But I would reject such a reading as
being not only contrary to the spirit of the decision, but also quite
absurd. If repossession by the sheriff under a writ of replevin is too
barbaric for the Court, repossession by the secured creditor's own act or
by some repossession team hired by him for the purpose, is still more
offensive to common decency. And it is also unconstitutional for the
state to tolerate it. The state is responsible for the taking if it has a law
either expressly or implicity permitting one person to seize the goods
of another without a determination of his right prior to the seizure.
It would be easy to argue that the security agreement itself con-
tained, either expressly or by reference to the law, a consent by the
debtor to the repossession in case of default. But this argument will
not stand up, because if the law is unconstitutional, no repetition of its
words in a security agreement will do the secured party any good.
I do not share the view of Mr. Justice White, in his dissent, that all that
is needed to get around the decision is to waive the right to a pre-seizure
hearing in the security agreement. The majority makes it very plain
that a clause of this kind, being a waiver of constitutional rights, is
void if it is contained in contracts of adhesion, which include most
security agreements, at least in the consumer field. Nor would it make
any real difference whether the clause were printed in a conspicuous
manner or specially brought to the attention of the debtor before he
signed for the loan. His adherence would be no more voluntary than
if the caluse were completely buried in fine print. Nevertheless, in a
truly bargained contract, a clause allowing private repossession would,
I think, be valid under the Court's decision.
It is regrettable that this case was not decided during the process
of revision. The Permanent Editorial Board may still take cognizance
of it, and may decide, as a result, to recommend a change in section
9-503 before the new Article Nine is passed by state legislatures. This
change would probably consist in the establishment of a summary pro-
cedure under which the debtor can have an opportunity to be heard
before the collateral is removed from his possession. At the very end
of the opinion, the Court makes clear that such a hearing need not be
a trial in which the merits are conclusively established. Due process is
satisfied, according to the Court, if the hearing establishes "at least the
probable validity" of the secured party's claim to repossession, since
its sole purpose is "to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivation of the
debtor's property. 1i7
Transition Provisions
a) NEED TO FILE OR REFILE
The provisions for the transition from the old Article Nine to the
new are concerned mostly with problems of filing, and their basic aim
-Id. at 2002, 2003.
[Vol. 34
33
Headrick: The New Article Nine Of The Uniform Commercial Code: An Introduction And Critique (Part II)
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1973
THE NEW ARTICLE NINE
is to avoid surprise to secured parties who have perfected their interests
under the old law. There is but one case where a refiling will have to
take place on or before the effective date of the new Code. This is the
case of an assignment of future accounts, if the place where the debtor
keeps his accounts does not coincide with his main executive office
(section 11-105(2)). For security interests in equipment or inventory
there will be no need to refile, because the place of filing is the same
under both the old and the new Codes. For accounts already assigned
prior to the effective date, no refiling is required, because of the short-
term character of the accounts.
Purchase money security interests in agricultural equipment cost-
ing less than $2,500 are exempt from filing under the old Article Nine,
but not under the new. Instead of requiring a filing on the effective
date, however, section 11-106(1) gives a three-year period from the date
the new Code comes into force for the secured party to file. In practice,
this means that he will almost never have to file because purchase
money interests in such inexpensive equipment very seldom extend
beyond three years.
Security interests on the property of transmission utilities are sub-
ject to complex provisions. If the old U.C.C. has been amended in the
state to provide a filing of indefinite duration in the office of the
secretary of state, the new Article Nine brings no change, and the old
filing remains effective. But if the state had dealt with the problem of
transmission utilities by a different statute or had not dealt with it at
all, a filing must be made with the secretary of state. There is a double
rule for such filing: for existing equipment, in which the secured party
already has a perfected interest, a three-year period of grace is given;
but for new equipment which becomes subject to the security interest
after the effective date, a new filing must take place, at the very
latest, on the day the utility obtains possession of the new equipment
under section 11-105(2).
Why three years for refiling in the case of existing equipment ? Per-
haps the reason for the distinction between existing and future equip-
ment of a transmission utility is merely a conceptual one: in the case
of future equipment, the interest arises during the effectiveness of the
new Code, but in the case of old equipment the interest was already per-
fected prior to that time. This reason does not seem convincing, since
it makes a distinction between notice filing and ordinary or perfection
filing prior to the effective date, and gives the latter more force and
effect than the former. The prejudice against notice filing is one which
I thought had been completely overcome when the old Code was drafted.
It would have been better to require filing with the secretary of state
on or before the effective date for present as well as future interests
in transmission utility equipment. If the advice of allowing ample time
between enactment and effectiveness (found in the Discussion to section
11-101) is followed, there would be opportunity enough for the financers
,1.973'1
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of transmission utilities to inform themselves of the need to refile and
to do so. Even under the new rule, they ought to refile prior to effec-
tiveness, to cover any new equipment which the utility may thereafter
acquire.
b) LAPs:
There is a different rule for lapse under the old and the new
Codes. Under the old Code, if the financing statement contained a
maturity date less than five years from the date of filing, the statement
lapsed sixty days after maturity. Under the new Code it lapses five
years from the date of filing in all cases (section 9-403(2)). To answer
the question how long a filing caught in the change would last, section
11-105(1) provides that it would be effective "not less than five years
after the filing." Hence filing officers who have not already done so
will have to arrange their existing files by years as soon as the new
Article Nine comes into force, and disregard any maturity date which
may appear on financing statements which have not yet lapsed on the
effective date.
c) PRIORITIES
The principal difference between the old and the new Article Nine
lies in the area of priorities, for which the unforeseen consequences of
the old rules relating to construction mortgages and accounts as pro-
ceeds of inventory have been remedied. Another important change in
the area of priorities relates to the position of lien creditors who, under
the new Code, will prevail over unperfected security interests despite
their knowledge of the existence of such interests.
There is one area where the old Code is clear and one where it is
not. Where it is clear, which is in regard to lien creditors and fixtures,
it is impossible to say that the new Code is declaratory of the meaning
of the old. Hence, section 11-107 provides that the old U.C.C. will
apply if "the positions of the parties were fixed prior to the effective
date of the new U.C.C." But for the priority problems on which the
old Code was vague and unintending, as in the area of accounts and
inventory, it would be wrong to apply this principle. Instead, recourse
should be had to the rule of section 11-108, by virtue of which,
"unless a change in law has clearly been made, the provisions of the new
U.C.C. shall be deemed declaratory of the meaning of the old U.C.C."
In fact, even before the new U.C.C. becomes effective, its provisions
constitute scholarly authority, similar to that of the Restatements, and
can guide courts around the ambiguities and away from the unintended
results of the old Code.
Conclusion
It is impossible at this point to know whether the New Article Nine
will be a successful and long-lasting statute. The most I can offer
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therefore is my personal evaluation of its innovations, based on an
analysis of the way the rules are framed.
Half of the total number of sections have been revised and seven
sections, among the most important, have been completely rewritten.
And yet few changes of substance have been introduced. The vast ma-
jority of the changes are improvements of draftsmanship, clarifications
of points left in doubt, and corrections of mistakes due to an inability
at the time of the original drafting to realize the consequences certain
rules would have. Some substantial changes have been made, and many
have yet to be accomplished. To show the relationship between the
different types of changes and non-changes, I will use the time-honored
method of drawing up a balance sheet. Under the heading of "assets"
are placed the positive substantial changes. Under the heading of
"liabilities" are the changes which, in my opinion, ought to have been
made, but were left out. As "surplus" are listed the most outstanding
improvements of a technical nature, though use of the word "surplus"
is dictated by generally accepted accounting practices and not by a
personal belief that such improvements are unnecessary.
a) ASSETS
The greatest improvements of the new Article Nine were brought
about in the area of priorities. The relative position of the earlier
accounts financer and the later inventory financer has been adjusted
in favor of the former. The priority position of consignors has been
established by analogy to that of purchase money financers of inventory.
The mortgagee of real property will not be subordinated to later pur-
chase money security interests in fixtures, unless such interests are fix-
ture filed or, in the case of readily removable machines and consumer
appliances, at least perfected. And the construction mortgagee is given
a new priority in relation to all fixtures installed during construction,
with the exception of removable machines, on which he places no re-
liance. The knowing lien creditor is no longer subordinate to the unfiled
security interest. And the rank of the secured party making future
advances has been elaborately, if not always fairly, established.
Apart from the area of priorities there are only two substantial
changes. Both have to do with the place of perfection. They deal with
the place of filing on the national level and with the problems arising
when motor vehicles move into or out of certificate of title jurisdictions.
b) SURPLUS
Most of the technical changes have to do with proceeds and the
financing statement. Proceeds need no longer be claimed expressly,
either in the security agreement or on the financing statement. On
the other hand, a claim to them must be perfected within ten days if
the original filing is not suitable for them. Insurance proceeds are now
clearly proceeds. Financing statements need no longer contain the
1973]
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signature of the secured party. The debtor's name must be his real
name, not his trade name, and if a partnership it must contain the name
of the partnership rather than that of the partners. The financing state-
ment lapses after five years regardless of the maturity of the debt; and
lapse has a retroactive effect to the prejudice of the secured party. Other
changes are: the concept of "contract rights" has been deleted; agri-
cultural equipment worth less than $2,500 is now subject to filing;
notice of time and place of foreclosure need be given only to those junior
secured parties who request it in writing; security interests in extracted
minerals and the accounts arising from their sale must be filed in the
realty records of the wellhead or minehead; the filing of a security
interest in fixtures in the chattel records is a means of perfection; and
interests in the assets of transmission utilities (whether the assets be
chattels or fixtures) need be filed but once in each state, in the office
of the secretary of state, with the duration of such filings being in-
definite.
c) LIABILITIES
MKany serious defects plague Article Nine even after the revision.
Foremost among them is the failure to require equipment leases to be
filed, thus creating a loophole in the Code's coverage which encourages
evasion and litigation. The next most serious defect is the callous indif-
ference to the interests of the farmer in the area of crop financing. De-
spite the admitted defects of the old Code, the draftsmen of the revision
felt that improvements were not worth making. They did not require
a real estate filing for crop mortgages, thereby undermining the financ-
ing of crops because of the impossibility of determining priorities be-
tween crop mortgagees and real estate parties. As a favor to lenders,
they did abolish the restriction on mortgaging future crops, although
in contradiction to that decision, they retained the feeble enabling crop
priority rule, apparently because its small practical importance made a
deletion not worth the effort. The third serious defect in the new Article
Nine is the casual way in which all conflict of laws questions, with the
exception and those on place to file, are combined in section 1-105,
which is not adequate as a statement of conflicts in contract matters, and
less as a pointer to the law governing foreclosure. Among the lesser
defects are the following: the failure to specify that the statute of
frauds is complied with when the debtor signs a financing statement in
lieu of the security agreement; the failure to set up rules for cash
proceeds outside insolvency proceedings; the failure to render void a
security interest in future equipment, thus solving problems of priority
and bankruptcy in a single stroke; the failure to allow the buyer in the
ordinary course of business to prevail over the secured party when
the security interest had been created not by the seller, but by a third
person; the failure to say explicitly that a fixture filing is enough to
perfect an interest in goods likely to become fixtures, although they
are not installed on the land as foreseen: the failure to delete the word
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"products" from the form of a financing statement; the failure to say
outright that accounts are not proceeds of inventory, thereby making it
possible for a new business to obtain financing by first mortgaging the
inventory and later assigning the accounts; and finally, the failure to
take the short step of proclaiming that perfection of a security interest
is necessary for its validity against the debtor, not only to simplify the
overall structure of the Code, but more importantly to safeguard the
debtor against casual security agreements which do not become important
for the creditor until the debtor goes into default.
d) NET WORTH
Accountants place the "surplus" on the same side of the balance
sheet as "liabilities," but to do so in an evaluation of the new Article
Nine would be impossible. Departing, then, from accepted practices, and
adding together assets and surplus, there are significant improvements,
both in number and in quality. The changes are almost all for the
better, and thus the new Article Nine should be passed in every juris-
diction of this country which has already enacted the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, though with a non-conforming amendment in the area of
crops. Passage should not take place under the illusion that we now
have a definite and perfect statement of the law of security interests
in chattels. The new Article Nine still needs to be revised, and it is my
hope that within the next few decades another Review Committee will
be appointed to make still further improvements, which will not be
hampered by external restrictions, such as those which limited the work
of the recent Review Committee to proposing piecemeal amendments
to sections that had proved unworkable or obviously required amend-
ment.
A new Review Committee should be free to take a fresh look at the
general structure of the Code, and to rewrite many of its provisions in
a more understandable form. Indeed, one of the gravest defects of the
old Articles Nine which has aggravated itself in the new one, is the style
of draftsmanship. It oscilates between long sentences devoid of punctua-
tion and extremely concise, often delphic, statements, the full impli-
cations of which do not become clear until after a lengthy study. An-
other serious defect of style is the dividing up of a single sentence into a
large number of subsections or paragraphs, in an attempt to compress
rules. From the point of view of content, the new Article Nine is a
very advanced and modern statute, but it is being deprived of the
influence over foreign legislation which it deserves by the fact that it
is totally untranslatable. In fact, to most foreign comparatists it is in-
comprehensible even in English. The same complaint can also be heard
from intelligent attorneys in the United States, and to the extent that
their complaint is true, the purpose of the law is defeated. To be carried
out effectively, its rules and policies must be within the reach of
ordinary lawyers and susceptible of being explained by them to their
1.973)
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clients. No law should be a mystery, the secrets of which are kept by
specialists, particularly when those secrets are not released evenly to all
who seek advice, but given exclusively to those who have retained the
specialists. The obscurity of the law then inevitably becomes an instru-
ment of social injustice.
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